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Abstract
Microdata protection is a hot topic in the eld of Statistical Disclosure Control, which
has gained special interest after the disclosure of 658000 queries by the America Online
(AOL) search engine in August 2006. Many algorithms, methods and properties have
been proposed to deal with microdata disclosure. One of the emerging concepts in mi-
crodata protection is k-anonymity, introduced by Samarati and Sweeney. k-anonymity
provides a simple and ecient approach to protect private individual information and is
gaining increasing popularity. k-anonymity requires that every record in the microdata
table released be indistinguishably related to no fewer than k respondents.
In this paper, we apply the concept of entropy to propose a distance metric to eval-
uate the amount of mutual information among records in microdata, and propose a
method of constructing dependency tree to nd the key attributes, which we then use
to process approximate microaggregation. Further, we adopt this new microaggregation
technique to study k-anonymity problem, and an ecient algorithm is developed. Ex-
perimental results show that the proposed microaggregation technique is ecient and
eective in the terms of running time and information loss.
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1 Introduction
British politicians gasped with astonishment when they were told on November 20th, 2007,
that two computer disks full of personal data of 25m British individuals had gone missing
[24]. The fate of the disks is unknown and the privacy of the individuals, whose personal data
are lost, is in danger. Unfortunately, this is the latest in a series of similar incidences. In
October, HM's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) lost another disk containing pension records
of 15,000 people, and it also lost a laptop containing personal data on 400 people in September
[7]. Data on 26.5m people were stolen from the home of an employee of the Department of
Veterans Aairs in America in 2006, and 658000 queries were disclosed by the AOL search
engine in August of the same year [15]. These pitfalls are not new. Due to the great advances
in the information and communication technologies, it is very easy to gather large amounts
of personal data, and mistakes such as those described are magnied.
There are many real-life situations in which personal data is stored: For example: (i)
Electronic commerce results in the automated collection of large amounts of consumer data.
These data, which are gathered by many companies, are shared with subsidiaries and partners.
(ii) Health care is a very sensitive sector with strict regulations. In the U.S., the Privacy
Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA [16]) requires the
strict regulation of protected health information for use in medical research. In most western
countries, the situation is similar, (see e.g. [2]). (iii) Cell phones have become ubiquitous
and services related to the current position of the user are growing fast. If the queries that a
user submits to a location-based server are not securely managed, it could be possible to infer
the consumer habits of the user [33]. (iv) The massive deployment of the Radio Frequency
IDentication (RFID) technology is a reality. On the one hand, this technology will increase
the eciency of supply chains and will eventually replace bar codes. On the other hand, the
existence of RFID tags in almost every object could be seen as a privacy problem [34].
In addition to these real-life situations, most countries have legislation which compels
national statistical agencies to guarantee statistical condentiality when they release data
collected from citizens or companies; see [23] for regulations in the European Union, [26] for
regulations in Canada, [27] for regulations in the U.S, and [28] for regulations in Australia.
Thus, protecting individual privacy is a key issue for many institutions, especially statistical
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agencies, Internet companies, manufacturers, etc; and many eorts have been devoted to
develop techniques guaranteeing some degree of personal privacy.
In order to protect privacy, Samarati and Sweeney [31, 38, 29, 30] proposed the k-
anonymity model, where some of the quasi-identier elds are suppressed or generalized so
that, for each record in the modied table, there are at least k   1 other records in the mod-
ied table that are identical to it with respect to the quasi-identier attributes. The general
approach adopted in the literatures to achieve k-anonymity is suppression/generalization, so
that minimizing information loss translates to reducing the number and/or the magnitude of
suppressions and generalizations [1, 29, 38, 35, 37, 39, 20, 19, 21].
Another method to achieve anonymity is through microaggregation [12, 11, 32]. Microag-
gregation is a Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) technique consisting in the aggregation of
individual data. It can be considered as an SDC sub-discipline devoted to the protection of
microdata. Microaggregation can be seen as a clustering problem with constraints on the size
of the clusters. It is somehow related to other clustering problems (e.g., dimension reduction
or minimum squares design of clusters). However, unlike clustering, microaggregation is not
considered with the number of clusters or the number of dimensions, but only the minimum
number of elements that are grouped in each cluster.
1.1 Motivation
As stated in [9, 10, 11], the result and execution time of miroaggregation depends on the
number of the variables used in the microaggregation process. Microaggregation using fewer
variables sometimes oer the best solution. The question of interest is: Do we have to use
all the dimension resources (attributes) in the microaggregation, or can we use only a small
number of the attributes in the microaggregation process and obtain better solutions?
This paper is highly motivated by this. To answer the question, we introduce the concept of
entropy, an important concept in information theory, and propose a distance metric to evaluate
the amount of the mutual information among records in the microdata, and propose the
method of constructing dependency tree to nd the key attributes, which we can use to process
approximate microaggregation. Further, we apply this new microaggregation technique to
solve k-anonymity problem, and an ecient algorithm is developed. Finally, experimental
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results show that the proposed microaggregation technique is ecient and eective in terms
of running time and information loss.
Our Contributions:
 We propose a novel metric to measure the mutual information between attributes in the
microdata based on the concept of entropy, which captures the expected uncertainty in the
attribute pairs and the mutual information between them. We also discuss the properties of
this metric.
 Based on this mutual information measure, we develop a simple, yet ecient algorithm
to nd the best dependency tree from the given microdata, and we also discuss how to
select key attributes from the best dependency tree, and how to use it for the approximate
microaggregation.
 We apply our technique to k-anonymity problem, and develop an ecient algorithm for
it. Experimental results show that the proposed microaggregation technique is eective and
ecient compared with the previous microaggregation method.
Running Example
ID A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
r1 0 0 0 1 1 1
r2 0 1 1 0 1 0
r3 1 1 0 1 0 0
r4 0 0 1 1 1 1
r5 0 1 1 1 0 0
r6 0 0 1 0 0 1
r7 1 1 1 0 0 1
r8 0 1 1 0 0 0
r9 1 1 1 0 1 1
r10 0 1 1 1 0 1
r11 0 1 1 1 0 0
r12 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Sample data
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For the simplicity of illustration, we use the data shown in Table 1 as our running example.
There are 12 records fr1; r2;    ; r12g in the sample data and each record contains 6 attributes
fA1;    ; A6g. For each attribute Ai (1  i  6), we dene the probability P (Ai = x) as
the fraction of rows whose projection onto Ai is equal to x, where x 2 f0; 1g. For instance,
P (A1 = 1) = 1=3, P (A3 = 0) = 1=6 and P (A1 = 1; A3 = 0) = 1=12.
2 Background
Many techniques have been proposed to deal with the anonymity problem. In this section,
we introduce some basic concepts regarding this. First, we take a look at some fundamental
concepts of microaggregation and k-anonymity. Then, we show how to achieve k-anonymity
through microaggregation.
2.1 Microaggregation
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) seeks to transform data in such a way that the data can
be publicly released whilst preserving utility and privacy, where the latter means avoiding
disclosure of information that can be linked to specic individual or corporate respondent
entities. Microaggregation is an SDC technique consisting in the aggregation of individual
data. It can be considered as an SDC sub-discipline devoted to the protection of the micro-
data. Microaggregation can be seen as a clustering problem with constraints on the size of
the clusters. It is somehow related to other clustering problems (e.g., dimension reduction or
minimum squares design of clusters). However, the main dierence of the microaggregation
problem is that it does not consider the number of clusters to generate or the number of
dimensions to reduce, but only the minimum number of elements that are grouped in the
same cluster.
Microaggregation has been used for several years in dierent countries. It started at
Eurostat [8] in the early nineties, and has since then been used in Germany [25] and several
other countries [13]. Microaggregation is relevant not only with SDC, but also in articial
intelligence [10]. In the latter eld, the application is to increase the knowledge of a system
for decision making and domain representation. Microaggregation techniques may also be
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Gender Age Postcode Problem
male middle 4350 stress
male middle 4350 obesity
male young 4351 stress
female young 4352 obesity
female old 4353 stress
female old 4353 obesity
Table 2: A raw microdata
Gender Age Postcode Problem
male middle 4350 stress
male middle 4350 obesity
 young 435 stress
 young 435 obesity
female old 4353 stress
female old 4353 obesity
Table 3: A 2-anonymous microdata
69 5 11104
5 55 1010 10
Average
Origianl data
Microaggregated data
record
Figure 1: Example of microaggregation
used in data mining in order to scale down or even compress the data set while minimizing
the information loss.
When we microaggregate data we have to keep two goals in mind: (i) Preserving data
utility. To do this, we should introduce as little noise as possible into the data; i.e., we should
aggregate similar elements instead of dierent ones. In the example in Figure 1, groups of
three elements are built and aggregated. Note that elements in the same aggregation group
are similar. (ii) Protecting the privacy of the individuals. Data have to be suciently modied
to make re-identication dicult; i.e., by increasing the number of aggregated elements, we
increase data privacy. In the example in Figure 1, after aggregating the chosen elements, it is
impossible to distinguish them, so that the probability of linking any individual is inversely
proportional to the number of aggregated elements.
In order to determine whether two elements are similar, a similarity function such as
the Euclidean distance, Minkowski distance or Chebyshev distance can be used. A common
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measure is the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE). The SSE is the sum of squared distances from
the centroid of each group to every record in the group, and is dened as:
SSE =
sX
i=1
niX
j=1
(xij   xi)0(xij   xi) (1)
where s is the number of groups, ni is the number of records in the i
th group, xij is the j
th
record in the ith group and xi is the average record of the i
th group. Optimal multivariate
microaggregation, that is, with minimum SSE, was shown to be NP-hard in [22]. The only
practical microaggregation methods are heuristic.
2.2 K-Anonymity
k-anonymity, suggested by Samarati and Sweeney [31, 38, 29, 30], is an interesting approach to
reduce the conict between information loss and privacy protection. To dene of k-anonymity,
we need to enumerate the various types of attributes that can appear in a microdata set T :
 Identier attributes that can be used to identify a record, such as Name and Medicare
card. Since our objective is to prevent sensitive information from being linked to specic
respondents, we will assume in what follows that identier attributes in the microdata have
been removed or encrypted in a pre-processing step.
 Quasi-identier (QI) attributes are those, such as Postcode and Age, that in combination,
can be linked with external information to re-identify (some of) the respondents to whom
(some of) the records in the microdata belong. Unlike identier attributes, QI attributes
can not be removed from the microdata, because any attribute is potentially a QI attribute.
 Sensitive attributes that are assumed to be unknown to an intruder and need to be pro-
tected, such as Disease or ICD-9 Code1.
1International Statistical Classication of Diseases and Related Health Problems: ICD-9, which provides
multiple external links for looking up ICD codes. Available http://icd9cm.chrisendres.com/.
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Denition 1 (k-anonymity). A protected microdata set is said to satisfy k-anonymity, if,
for each combination of QI attributes, at least k records exist in the microdata sharing that
combination
Note that, if a protected microdata T 0 satises k-anonymity, an intruder trying to link
T 0 with an external non-anonymous data source will nd at least k records in T 0 that match
any value of the QI attributes the intruder use for linkage. Thus re-identication, i.e., map-
ping a record in T 0 to a non-anonymous record in the external data source, is not possible.
For example, Table 3 is a 2 anonymous view of Table 2 if QI attributes are fGender, Age,
Postcodeg.
If for a given k, k-anonymity is assumed to be enough protection for respondents, one can
concentrate on minimizing information loss with the only constraint that k-anonymity should
be satised. This is a clean way of solving the tension between data protection and data
utility. The general approach adopted in the literature to achieve k-anonymity is suppres-
sion/generalization, so that minimizing information loss translates to reducing the number
and/or the magnitude of suppressions and generalizations [29, 38, 35]. Generalization consists
in substituting the values of a given attribute with more general values. We use  to denote
the more general value. For instance, in Table 3, Postcode 4351 and 4352 are generalized to
435. Suppression refers to removing the part or entire value of attributes from the microdata.
Note that suppressing an attribute to reach k-anonymity can equivalently be modeled via a
generalization of all the attribute values to .
The drawbacks of partially suppressed and coarsened data for analysis were highlighted
in [12]:
1. Satisfying k-anonymity with minimum data modication using generalization (recod-
ing) and local suppression was shown to be NP-hard by Meyerson and Williams [21],
Aggarwal et al. [1] and Sun et al. [36];
2. Using global recoding for generalization causes too much information loss, and using
local recoding complicates data analysis by causing old and new categories to co-exist
in the recoded data;
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3. There is no standard way of using local suppression and analyzing partially suppressed
data usually requires specic software;
4. Last but not least, when numerical attributes are generalized, they become non-numerical.
Joint multivariate microaggregation of all QI attributes with minimum group size k was
proposed in [12] as an alternative to achieve k-anonymity. Besides being simpler, this alterna-
tive has the advantage of yielding complete data without any coarsening (nor categorization
in the case of numerical data). Other proposals [18, 35, 36, 37] generalize ordinal numeri-
cal data, replacing numerical data by intervals. In the case of the k-anonymity application,
micro-aggregation is performed on the projection of records on QI attributes.
The rst algorithm, known as Maximum Distance to Average Vector (MDAV), to achieve
microaggregation through k-anonymity was proposed in [11]. The MDAV algorithm works as
follows: First, it computes the centroid (average record) of records in the data set, and nd
the most distant record r from the centroid and the most distant record s from r. Second,
it forms two groups around r and s: the rst group contains r and the k   1 records closest
to r; the other group contains s and the k   1 records closest to s. Finally, the two group
are microaggregated and removed from the original dataset. The steps are repeated until
there are no records in the original dataset. Although MDAV generates groups of xed size
k, it lacks exibility for adapting the group size to the distribution of the records in the
data set, which may result in poor homogeneity in a group. Variable-size MDAV (V-MDAV)
was proposed to overcome this limitation by computing a variable-size group, and a detailed
analysis can be found in [32].
In the next section, we will propose our approximate microaggregation technique, and
show how to apply it to solve k-anonymity in order to overcome most of the problems of
generalization/suppression listed above.
3 Approximate Microaggregation
The work presented in this paper is based on information theory, and is related to the applica-
tion of dependency tree of information theory in data mining and databases. In this section,
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we rst introduce the concept of entropy, and the mutual information measure, which cap-
tures the mutual dependency between attributes. Then we introduce our microaggreation
technique by constructing the dependency tree, and nally, we apply this microaggregation
technique to k-anonymity problem, and an ecient algorithm is proposed.
3.1 Mutual Information Measure
We are more surprised when an unlikely outcome happens than a likely one occurs. A useful
measure of the surprise of an event with probability p is  log2p. The main concept of infor-
mation theory is that of entropy, which measures the expected uncertainty or the amount of
information provided by a certain event. The entropy of X is dened by:
H(X) =  
X
x
P (X = x)log2P (X = x)
with 0log20 = 0 by convention. It can be shown that 0  H(X)  log2jXj, with H(X) =
log2jXj only for the uniform distribution, P (X = x) = 1=jxj for all x 2 X. For instance,
in the given running example, H(A1) =  (8=12)log2(8=12)   (4=12)log2(4=12) = 0:9183,
H(A2) = 0:8113 and H(A1; A2) = 1:5546.
The conditional entropy H(Y jX) of a random variable Y given X is then dened as:
H(Y jX) =  
X
x;y
p(x; y)log2p(yjx)
where p(x; y) is the joint distribution of variables X and Y . The conditional entropy has the
following properties:
Proposition 1: Let H(Y jX) be the conditional entropy for Y given X, then,
(1) 0  H(Y jX)  H(Y );
(2) H(X; Y ) = H(X) +H(Y jX) = H(Y ) +H(XjY );
(3) H(X; Y )  H(X) +H(Y )
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The proof of Proposition 1 is given in [40]. According to the proposition, the condi-
tional entropy H(Y jX) can be rewritten as: H(Y jX) = H(X;Y )   H(X), which provides
an alternative and easy way to compute the conditional entropy H(Y jX). For instance, in
our running example, H(A1jA2) = H(A1; A2)   H(A1) = 1:5546   0:9183 = 0:6363 and
H(A2jA1) = 0:7433.
We adopt the conditional entropy to measure the mutual information, which is a distance
metric.
Denition 2 (Mutual Information Measure). The mutual information measure with re-
gard to two random variables A and B is dened as:
MI(A;B) = H(AjB) +H(BjA) (2)
Mutual information measure is a measure of how independent are the two random variables
when the value of each random variable is known. Two events A and B are independent if and
only if their mutual information measure achieves the maximum H(A) + H(B). Therefore,
the less the value of the mutual information measure is, the more dependent the two random
variables are. According to this measure, A is said to be more dependent on B than C, if
MI(A;B) MI(A;C).
Theorem 1: The mutual information measure MI(A;B) satises the following properties:
(1) MI(A;B)  0;
(2) MI(A;B) =MI(B;A);
(3) MI(A;B) +MI(B;C) MI(A;C)
Proof: The rst two are easy to be veried. Here, we give the detail for the third one. Note
that,
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H(AjC)  H(A;BjC) (3)
 H(BjC) +H(AjB;C) H(C) (4)
 H(BjC) +H(AjB) +H(C) H(C) (5)
= H(BjC) +H(AjB) (6)
The inequalities (3) and (4) hold because of Proposition 1(1) and (2). (5) holds due to
Proposition 1(3) and (6) holds because of Proposition 1(2). Then,
MI(A;B) +MI(B;C) (7)
= H(AjB) +H(BjA) +H(BjC) +H(CjB) (8)
= (H(AjB) +H(BjC)) + (H(CjB) +H(BjA))
 H(AjC) +H(CjA) (9)
= MI(A;C) (10)
The equality (8) holds because of the denition of mutual information measure and the
inequality (9) holds because of (6).
It is easy to verify thatMI(A;B) = 0 if and only if there is a one-to-one function mapping
between A and B. Since when H(BjA) = 0, B is a function of A, then when MI(A;B) = 0 if
and only if H(BjA) = 0 and H(AjB) = 0; i.e, there is a one-to-one function mapping between
A and B. In this sense, the mutual information measure MI(A;B) we dened is a distance
metric.
3.2 Dependency Tree
Dependency tree was introduced by Chow and Liu [4], in which they introduced an algorithm
for tting a multivariate distribution with a tree (i.e., a density model that assumes that
there are only pairwise dependency between variables). In the maximum likelihood sense, the
12
dependency tree is the best tree to t the dataset, and it uses mutual information measure
to estimate the dependency of two random variables.
The dependency tree has been used in nding dependency structure in the features which
improve the classication accuracy of the Bayes network classiers [14]. [5] uses the depen-
dency tree to represent a set of frequent patterns, which can be used to summarize patterns
into few proles. [17] presents a large node dependency tree, in which the nodes are subsets
of variables of dataset. The large node dependency tree is applied to density estimation and
classication.
Denition 3 (Dependency Matrix). Given microdata T with n records fr1; r2;    ; rng,
where each record contains m attributes fA1; A2;    ; Amg, the dependency matrix DT is de-
ned as:
DT = (MI(i; j))mm
where MI(i; j) is the mutual information measure, i; j 2 fA1; A2;    ; Amg.
For instance, the dependency matrix in our running example is as follows:0BBBBBBBBB@
0 1:3796 1:5339 1:8777 1:8777 1:8126
1:3796 0 1:3753 1:7772 1:6681 1:3180
1:5339 1:3753 0 1:3368 1:6217 1:6217
1:8777 1:7772 1:3368 0 1:9586 1:9586
1:8777 1:6681 1:6217 1:9586 0 1:7510
1:8126 1:3180 1:6217 1:9586 1:7510 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
With the dependency matrix, we could construct a fully connected weighted graph G =
(V;E; !), where V = fv1; v2;    ; vmg is the set of vertices, which corresponds to the attributes
in T , and for each pair of vertices (vi; vj) there is an edge eij connecting them, and !(eij)
refers to the weight of each eij between vi and vj, which can be obtained from the dependency
matrix. An example of such a fully connected graph is shown in Figure 2(Left).
We observe that !(eij) represents to what extent vertex vi (or attribute Ai) is dependent
on vj (or Aj). Although, in the worst case, any pair of attributes can be dependent, however,
as stated in [4], we could simplify by using an approximation which ignores the conditions on
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A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
G
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
TG
1.3796
1.3753
1.7772
1.6217
1.3180
Figure 2: Left: Fully connected graph G; Right: Its minimum spanning tree TG (Right)
v1
v2
vm· · · · · ·v3 v1 v2 · · · · · · vm
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Proof of Theorem 2
multiple attributes, and retaining only dependency in at most a single attribute at a time,
which results in a tree-like structure. It is easy to see that in the fully connected weighted
graph G, there are a large number of trees, each of which represents a unique approximation
dependency structure. Here, in order to reduce the uncertainty in the dataset and maximize
the mutual information among the attributes simultaneously, we nd the minimum spanning
tree as our best dependency tree from the fully connected graph G based on our proposed
mutual information measure. Here, we use the Kruskal algorithm [6], which is essentially a
greedy algorithm. The candidate edges are sorted in increasing order of their weights (i.e.
mutual information measure). Then, starting with an empty set E0, the algorithm examines
one edge at a time (in the order resulting from the sort operation), checks if it forms a cycle
with the edges already in E0 and, if not, adds it to E0. The algorithm ends when m 1 edges
have been added to E0, where m refers to the number of vertices in G.
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Algorithm 1: Finding best dependency tree
1. Compute the mutual information measure between
each pair of attributes in T and construct the dependency
matrix DT . There are m(m  1)=2 weight need to be
calculated, since T has m attributes.
2. Construct a fully connected graph, where the nodes
correspond to the attributes in T . The weight of each edge
refers to their mutual information measure.
3. Find the best dependency tree by the the minimum
spanning tree algorithm.
The algorithm of nding best dependency tree is briey described in Algorithm 1 and an
example of the found out best dependency tree is shown in Figure 2(Right).
After nding out the best dependency tree, we need to set out rules to select the key
attributes from the dependency tree to process approximate microaggregation.
Denition 4 (Degree of The Vertex). Let G = (V;E) be a graph, where V = fv1; v2;    ; vmg.
Then, the degree of the node vi is the number of edges incident to the nodes, denoted by deg(vi).
For example, in Figure 2(Right), deg(A2) = 4, and deg(A3) = 2. Let TG be the best
dependency tree found in G. We then compute the degree of each vertex in TG and sort them
in decreasing order. Without loss of generality, we assume that deg(v1)  deg(v2)     
deg(vm) after they are sorted in decreasing order. Then, the principle of choosing the key
attributes is as follows:
Denition 5 (Choosing Key Attributes). Suppose deg(v1)  deg(v2)      deg(vm)
after they are sorted. Then, the vertices v1; v2;    vk are chosen as the key attributes if the
following two requirements are satised at the same time:
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Algorithm 2: k-anonymity through approximate microaggregation
Input: Microdata set T consisting of n records having m attributes each.
Output: Microaggregated microdata T 0 satisfying k-anonymity property
1. Find out the best dependency tree by Algorithm 1 and select the key attributes
2. Project the records of T to the key attributes.
3. Computes the centroid (average record) x of records in the projected data set, and nd
the most distant record r from the centroid and the most distant record s from r.
4. Form two groups around r and s: the rst group contains r and the k   1 records
closest to r; The other group contains s and the k   1 records closest to s.
5. If there are at least 2k records which do not belong to any of the groups formed
in Step 4, go to Step 3, taking the previous set of records minus the groups formed
in the latest instance of Step 4, as the new set of records.
6. If there are between k and k   1 records which do not belong to any of the groups
formed in Step 4, form a new group with those records and exit the algorithm.
7. If there are less than k remaining records which do not belong to any of the groups
formed in Step 4, add them to the group formed in Step 4 whose centroid is closest to
the centroid of the remaining records.
8. Return microaggregated data T 0 by replacing each record by the centroid of the group
it belongs to.
k 1X
i=1
deg(vi) < m (11)
kX
i=1
deg(vi)  m (12)
For example, for the minimum spanning tree TG in Figure 2, we choose attributes A2 and
A3 as the key attributes, since according to the principle described above, deg(A2) < 6 and
deg(A2) + deg(A3) = 6.
Theorem 2: Let TG be the best dependency tree of G, with V = fv1; v2;    ; vmg, and N be
the number of selected key attributes. Then, 2  N  m=2.
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Proof: Since in a tree-like structure, the maximum degree of a vertex ism 1 [6], and without
loss of generality, we assume that deg(v1) = m   1, and in this case, the best dependency
tree found has the form as shown in Figure 3(a), and then according to Denition 5, only
two vertices will be selected as key attributes, say v1 and v2. This is the situation when
the number of the selected key attributes reaches the minimality. On the other hand, when
the number of the selected key attributes reaches the maximality, the structure of the best
dependency tree has the form as shown in Figure 3(b), and in this case, at most m=2 key
attributes will be selected. So, 2  N  m=2.
Theorem 2 assures that at most half the amount of dimension resources are needed in the
microaggregation process with our technique, which could signicantly reduce the execution
time. In the next section, we discuss in detail how to apply this technique to k-anonymity
problem.
3.3 Application to K-Anonymity
Our aim is to obtain k-anonymous microdata without coarsened nor partially suppressed
data. This makes their analysis and exploitation easier, with the additional advantage that
numerical continuous attributes are not categorized. In this section, we adopt the approximate
microaggregation technique to solve k-anonymity problem.
Our algorithm receives as input a microdata set T consisting of n records having m at-
tributes each. The result of the algorithm is a k-partition used to microaggregate the original
microdata set and to generate a microaggregated data set T 0 that fulls the k-anonymity
property. Instead of taking all the attributes into the microaggregation process, we only use
the selected key attributes, which captures the dependency between attributes, to microag-
gregate the data. The novelty and dierence from the previous microaggregation methods
exist here. Our proposed approach is eective and ecient in terms of running time and
information loss.
The rst two steps of the algorithm builds the initial dataset for microaggregation. It
selects the key attributes from the best dependency tree and returns a projected dataset,
which has the same number of records as T , but each record only contains the value of key
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attributes. Once the average record is computed, the algorithm looks for other records which
are distant to it and adds records to it until it reaches a minimum cardinality k (Step 3-
4). After repeating this process several times, a set of groups satisfying the k-anonymity
property is obtained. However, a number of records can remain unassigned, and they must be
distributed amongst the previously created groups (Step 5-7). Finally, the algorithm further
microaggregates the original microdata T by replacing each record in T by the centroid of the
group to which it belongs (Step 8). The algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 2.
In this section, we discuss in detail how to apply our microaggregation technique to solve
k-anonymity in order to overcome most of the problems of generalization/suppression listed
in Section 2 in the following aspects:
 Approximate microaggregation is a unied approach, unlike the dual method combining
generalization and suppression.
 It does not complicate data analysis by adding new categories to the original scale, unlike
generalization/suppression.
 It does not result in suppressed data, which makes analysis of k-anonymous data easy.
 It is suitable to protect continuous data without removing their numerical semantics.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Data set
We employ a real-life CENSUS data set downloadable at http://www.ipums.org in the ex-
perimental study. The CENSUS data set contains the personal information of 500K American
adults. The data set has 9 discrete attributes summarized in Table 4. From CENSUS, we
create two sets of micro tables, in order to examine the inuence of dimensionality and the
impact of cardinality. The rst set has 6 tables, denoted as CENSUS-20%,    , CENSUS-
100%, respectively. Specically, CENSUS-t% (20  t  100) indicates the data set consisting
of t% records randomly sampled from the whole CENSUS data set, and each record has 9
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Attribute Number of distinct values
Age 78
Gender 2
Education 17
Marital 6
Race 9
Work-class 8
Country 83
Occupation 50
Salary-class 50
Table 4: Summary of attributes in CENSUS
attributes shown in Table 4. The second set contains 5 tables, denoted as 5-CENSUS,    ,
9-CENSUS, respectively, where n-CENSUS (3  n  9) represents the data set with the rst
n attributes selected from Table 4, and each data set has the same number of records as the
whole CENSUS data set.
4.2 Experiment setup
Our aim is to test the eciency and eectiveness of the proposed approximate microaggrega-
tion algorithm for k-anonymity. We denote our proposed algorithm as MA, and we compare
it with the previous MDAV-based algorithm [11], denoted as MA. We rst evaluate the
execution time of our approach by varying the cardinality of the data sets, the number of
attributes and the value of k. In order to compare the eectiveness, for each data set, we
adopt two measurements. One is to measure the information loss in terms of SSE=SST ,
where SSE is the sum of square errors as dened in equation (1), and SST refers to the sum
of square errors applied over the whole dataset. The other metric is to compare the number
of key attributes projected in the microaggregation.
4.3 Results
Eciency: Figures 4(a)-(c) show the comparison of execution time of two microaggregation
methods. In this set of experiments, we xed k = 20 and vary the data percentage. Figure
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Figure 4: Running time comparison between dierent methods
4(a) plots the result by varying the data percentage of the whole Census data set from
20% to 100%. As we can see, the AMA incurs less computation time than MA method.
This is expected since in the AMA process, less attributes are used in the microaggregation.
We can see the dierence of the computation cost is getting larger with the increased data
cardinality. Figure 4(b) describes the running time comparison when varying the privacy
parameter k. The computation cost of both MA and AMA algorithms is increasing with k,
but AMA consistently outperforms MA method. Figure 4(c) shows the computation overhead
dierences by altering the number of attributes. The computation overhead of both methods
is increasing when enlarging the number of attributes. The result is expected since the
overhead is increased with the more dimensions. The AMA method performs better than MA
algorithm since we use a part of the attributes instead of the whole dimensional resources,
which is signicantly reduce the amount of computation.
Eectiveness: Having veried the eciency of our technique, we proceed to test its eective-
ness. We measure the utility in terms of SSE=SST , where SSE is the sum of square errors
as dened in equation (1), and SST refers to the sum of square errors applied over the whole
data set. Figure 5 shows the number of key attributes used in MA and AMA approaches. As
we can see, the number remains the same for MA method, since it projects all the attributes
into the microaggregation process. On the contrary, the number of key attributes used in
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AMA is less than half of that used by MA approaches, which veries the results in Theorem
2.
Figures 6(a) and (b) show the information loss by applying MA and AMA algorithms.
Figure 6(a) is plotted by changing the percentage of data set. Although the result indicates
that AMA generates a little bit more information loss than MA, the dierence is not enlarged
when the data cardinality is increased. Similar tread is obtained in Figure 6(b) by varying the
value k. The information loss is increased with k, since larger k demands more strict privacy
requirement, which reduces the utility of the data.
Summary: Overall, the AMA outperforms MA in terms of eciency, and the dierence
is getting larger when the volume and dimension of data are increasing. Although AMA
generates a little bit more information loss than MA, it is still practical since AMA only uses
at most half of the attributes in the microaggregation process.
5 Related Work
Privacy preservation is an important issue in the release of data for mining purpose. The k-
anonymity model, which was introduced for protecting individual identication by Samarati
and Sweeney [29, 31], has been extensively investigated for its simplicity and eectiveness
[1, 29, 38, 35, 37, 39, 20, 19, 21]. k-anonymity requires that each record in the anonymous table
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Figure 6: Information loss comparison between dierent methods
be indistinguishable with at least k 1 other records within the dataset with respect to a set of
quasi-identier attributes. In this case, individuals cannot be uniquely identied by adversary,
so the individuals' privacy can be preserved. Started from [29, 31, 30], the general approach
adopted in the literature to achieve k-anonymity is based on generalization/suppression, which
has some defects on eciency, information loss and implementation. Our work in this paper
is related to the microaggregation technique, which has been introduced to implement k-
anonymous data set recently and remedies most of defects of generalization and suppression
[12, 10, 11, 22, 9].
In the previous research, all the dimensional resources (attributes) are required in the
microaggregation process. However, as mentioned in [10, 11, 9], the result and execution
time of the microaggregation highly depends on the number of the variables used in the mi-
croaggregation process, since few variables sometimes oers the better solutions. Dierent
from previous microaggregation methods, in this paper, we propose a new approach to select
only a small number of dimensional resources that captures the maximal dependency rela-
tionship among resources and as experiments show that the new technique achieves better
microaggregation results. Specically, our microaggregation method is eective and ecient
in terms of information loss and running time. In the case of k-anonymity problem, the
microaggregation approach presented in this paper could overcome most of the problems of
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generalization/suppression. (1) Our method is a unied approach, unlike the dual method
combining generalization and suppression. (2) It does not complicate data analysis by adding
new categories to the original scale, unlike generalization/suppression. (3) It does not result in
suppressed data, which makes analysis of k-anonymous data easy. (4) It is suitable to protect
continuous data without removing their numerical semantics. From a dierent perspective,
the microaggregation technique discussed in this paper produces better solutions compared
with previous ones.
Our work is also related to the application of dependency tree of information theory
in data mining and databases. The dependency tree has been used in nding dependency
structure in the features which improve the classication accuracy of the Bayes network
classiers [14]. [5] uses the dependency tree to represent a set of frequent patterns, which can
be used to summarize patterns into few proles. [17] presents large node dependency tree,
in which the nodes are subsets of variables of data set. The large node dependency tree is
applied to density estimation and classication. As far as its application to privacy preserving
data mining, fewer results are obtained. In this paper, we introduce the concept of entropy
and propose the mutual information measure to evaluate the mutual dependency between
attributes, and the method to construct the dependency tree. We also discuss how to select
key attributes from the constructed dependency tree, and how to use them in the approximate
microaggregation. We prove theoretically that at most half the amount of resources are needed
with our approach.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
k-anonymity is a property that, when satised by the microdata, can help increase the privacy
of the respondents whose data is being used. Previous approaches to obtain microdata sets
fullling the k-anonymity property were mainly based on suppression and generalization.
In this article, we have shown how to achieve the same property by means of approximate
microaggregation, which, dierent from the previous microaggregation method, uses a part of
the dimensional resources. It works by selecting key attributes from the best dependency tree,
which is constructed based on a new mutual information measure based on information theory,
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which captures the dependency between attributes in the microdata. The experimental results
show that the proposed technique is ecient and eective in the terms of running time and
information loss.
A number of other sophistication of k-anonymity for protecting against attribute disclosure
have recently been proposed, such as (p+; )-sensitive k-anonymity [37], l-diversity [20], (; k)-
anonymity [39], t-closeness [19]. All of them rely on generalizations, so the microaggregation
approach proposed in this paper would be a novelty in all of them. The technique proposed
in this paper restricted its focus on numerical attributes, and it is interesting to investigate
the extension to other types of attributes.
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